

V O X

P O P

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In This Issue

From the Editors	2
APSA 1986 Convention Preview	3
Early Returns:	
"The 1986 Elections"	
Gerald M. Pomper	8
"PACs in the 1986 Election"	
Theodore J. Eismeier	11
Abstracts of Recent Works	14

From the Editors:

This issue moves forward a bit more toward the kind of forum for the membership that we have envisioned -- thanks to the efforts of Gerry Pomper and Ted Eismeier. Some time ago, we received a letter from one of the members lamenting the absence of a more vital interest in the politics of parties and groups instead of the study of these organizations. As editors, we're not going to touch that debate with the proverbial ten-foot pole, except to point out to you that there is certainly room for both interests (in fact, many of us hold both simultaneously). Because both perspectives are alive and well among our members, we hope that this will stimulate many of you to take pen in hand (or word processor in whatever) and make a contribution to Vox Pop. Gerry and Ted have started us magnificently in that direction. It is up to others to continue. We will solicit pieces when it seems appropriate, but we look forward to the voluntary offerings concerning events which move you.

We hope the other material in this Vox Pop is of continuing use to our readers. We feel the article abstracts are important for all of us to see. Also, we know that many of you are already making travel plans for the APSA Convention and are interested in the program.

To whet your appetite -- literally -- we will alert you to the plans for a Dutch Treat luncheon to be held on August 29 at the APSA. This will be the business meeting for our section and will also be the inaugural for the awards established at the last business meeting. Watch your programs for more information.

As always, we hope any of you with ideas for improving Vox Pop will write to one of us. We hope you are having productive -- and relaxing -- summers.

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Convention Preview

The following list includes the ten panels sponsored by the Official Program Committee's Section 11.

Panel 11-1

TITLE: "Racial Differences in Attitude Formation Toward Political Parties, Politics, and Public Policy"

CHAIR: Lorn S. Foster, Pomona College

PAPERS: "Black Participation and the Delivery of Municipal Services"
Thomas E. Cavanaugh, National Research Council

"Racial Differences in Ideology, Issue Salience and Its Effect Upon the 1984 Election"
Lorn S. Foster, Pomona College
Susan Welch, University of Nebraska

"Racial Consciousness and Campaign Activism Among Black Americans in the 1984 Presidential Election"
James S. Jackson, University of Michigan
Ronald E. Brown, Eastern Michigan University

"Black and White Attitudes Toward the Parties: The Myth of Zero Partisanship"
John E. Stanga, Wichita State University
Patrick J. Kenney, Wichita State University
James F. Sheffield, Jr., Wichita State University

DISC.: Hanes Walton, Jr., Savannah State College
Linda S. Williams, The Joint Center for Political Studies

Panel 11-2

TITLE: "The News Media and American Politics"

CHAIR: Thomas Patterson, Syracuse University

PAPERS: "News Media Elites"
Robert Lichter, George Washington University

"The Public's Attitude about News Content"
Michael J. Robinson, George Washington University

"Media Coverage of National Political Institutions"
Richard Davis, SUNY, Geneseo

"Television, News Coverage, and Public Opinion in the 1984 Primaries"
Marc Howard Ross, Bryn Mawr College
Richard Joslyn, Temple University

DISC: William Adams, George Washington University
Margaret Latimer, Auburn University

Panel 11-3

TITLE: "Power and Elections"

CHAIR: Arthur H. Miller, University of Iowa

PAPERS: "Interest Group Participation in Presidential Candidate Selection"
Alan Abramowitz, SUNY at Stony Brook
Ronald Rapoport, College of William and Mary
Walter Stone, University of Colorado

"Strategic Voting in Presidential Primaries"
Priscilla Southwell, University of Oregon

"Political Action Committee, Mobilization of the Electorate"
John R. Wright, University of Iowa

"Group Power and Electoral Outcomes"
Arthur H. Miller, University of Iowa

DISC.: James E. Campbell, University of Georgia

Panel 11-4

TITLE: "Partisan Decline in the U.S.: Prospects for the Future"

CHAIR: Austin Ranney, American Enterprise Institute

PAPERS: "Political Parties as Representative Institutions"
Stephen C. Craig, University of Florida
Michael D. Martinez, University of Florida

"Do Voters Really Care About Political Parties Anymore: A
Response to Craig"
Martin P. Wattenberg, University of California, Irvine

"Long-Term Trends in Party Support: 1964-1984"
Jack Dennis, University of Wisconsin

DISC.: Warren E. Miller, Arizona State University
Austin Ranney, American Enterprise Institute

Panel 11-5

TITLE: "The Realignment of the Party System"

CHAIR: George Rabinowitz, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

**PAPERS: "The Dynamics of Political Realignment: Mobilization, Recruitment,
and Conversion"**
Lutz Erbrin, Norman Nie, and Edward Hamburg, University of Chicago

"Party Identification and Party Realignment"
Charles Franklin, Washington University

**"Civil Rights Policy and the Transformation of the New Deal Party
System: 1937-1982"**
Richard Champagne, University of Wisconsin

"Trends in Partisanship from 1984 to 1986"
Barbara Farah, The New York Times

DISC.: Paul Beck, Florida State University
Walter Dean Burnham, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Panel 11-6

TITLE: "Minorities, Demographics, and State Party Conventions"

CHAIR: Kay L. Schlozman, Boston College

PAPERS: "1984 State Party Convention Delegates: The Role of Age"
Stephen D. Shaffer, Mississippi State University
Dale A. Krane, Mississippi State University

"1984 State Party Convention Delegates: The Role of Blacks"
Charles D. Hadley, University of New Orleans
Harold W. Stanley, University of Rochester

"1984 State Party Convention Delegates: The Role of Religion"
Todd A. Baker, Laurence W. Moreland, and Robert P. Steed,
The Citadel

"1984 State Party Convention Delegates: The Role of Women"
Robert E. Darcy, **Oklahoma State University**
Janet M. Clark, **University of Wyoming**

DISC.: John S. Jackson III, **Southern Illinois University**
John J. McGlennon, **College of William and Mary**

Panel 11-7

TITLE: "Big City Politics in the Mid-1980's: New York and Chicago
As Exemplars"

CHAIR: Paul Green, **Governors State University**

PAPERS: "Ed Koch and the New York Political Tradition"
Peter Colby, **University of Central Florida**

"Harold Washington and the Chicago Political Tradition"
William Grimshaw, **Illinois Institute of Technology**

DISC.: Michael Preston, **University of Illinois at Urbana**
Howard A. Scarrow, **SUNY at Stony Brook**

Panel 11-8

TITLE: "Roundtable on Future Directions for Research on State and
Local Political Parties"

CHAIR: Malcolm E. Jewell, **University of Kentucky**

PARTICIPANTS: John Bibby, **University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee**
Cornelius Cotter, **University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee**
Alan Abramowitz, **SUNY at Stony Brook**
James Gibson, **University of Houston**
Samuel Eldersveld, **University of Michigan**
Timothy Conlin, **Senate Subcommittee on Intergovernmental
Relations**

Panel 11-9

TITLE: "Conceptual Development in the Study of Political Parties"

CHAIR: Joseph A. Schlesinger, Michigan State University

PARTICIPANTS: Robert Jackman, Michigan State University
James G. March, Stanford University
Mancur Olson, University of Maryland
Kenneth A. Shepsle, Washington University

Panel 11-10

TITLE: "Education for Politics: A Tribute to Bernard Hennessey"

CHAIR: Charles O. Jones, University of Virginia

PARTICIPANTS: Hon. Richard B. Chene, U.S. House of Representatives
Sidney Wise, Franklin and Marshall College
Robert J. Huckshorn, Florida Atlantic University
William J. Keefe, University of Pittsburgh
Marian Palley, University of Delaware

The 1986 Elections

Gerald M. Pomper

Rutgers University

Like Moby Dick, the elections of 1986 can be analyzed on three levels. We can call these levels of analysis political constants, political variables, and political individualism. Each form of analysis is valid, but each leads to different predictions.

The first level relies on historical patterns. In mid-term elections in the second term of a president, the national incumbent Republicans would be expected to lose about forty seats in the House and seven in the Senate. In 1986, this would mean an overwhelming Democratic majority in the lower chamber of Congress and a shift in control of the Senate, where the Republicans now hold a 53-47 majority.

Such an analysis is based on more than historical determinism. Losses for the president's party are explained by his inevitable loss of popularity after six years in office, and by variations in turnout: the "surge" in votes that originally brought victory to the incumbent president is followed by a disproportionate "decline" in voting among his supporters. This reasoning is particularly applicable to the 1986 Senate elections. When Ronald Reagan won his first landslide victory in 1980, he carried with him sixteen new Republican Senators. This year, these first-term legislators must face the electorate on their own. Altogether, there are 22 Republican seats at stake, compared to only 12 Democratic positions. Both the historical pattern and the numerical odds seem to favor a Democratic victory.

On the second level of analysis, that of political variables, there is more doubt. Considerable research over the past decade has shown that House and Senate voting varies with several independent variables. Although their relative weights are disputed, and vary among election years, the most important are: presidential popularity, economic conditions -- especially change in real income, ideology, and party identification.

As I write, all of these variables provide grounds for Republican optimism. President Reagan is enjoying the highest popularity of any chief executive in his sixth year in the White House. While there is some evidence of an impending slowdown, the collapse of world oil prices is sustaining economic prosperity for most Americans. In overall opinion, there are definite, if still tentative, indications of increased conservatism and increased Republican party identification among the electorate.

The third level of analysis is that of real individuals, the men and women who will be contesting, winning, and losing the

actual elections of 1986. Developments in campaign organization, election finance, and party structure have made these idiosyncratic factors more important than in the past. Incumbents, using such resources as name recognition, early accumulation of funds, and constituent services, are able to frighten potential opponents out of a race and to overcome any historical or national trends. Increasingly efficient national party organizations provide services and money to candidates in marginal races, winning seats that "should" be lost. Political action committees abet these trends, providing help particularly for incumbents and in close races.

One implication of these individualistic factors is that incumbents will do better than would be predicted using the other two modes of analysis. Thus, in 1982 and 1984, incumbents lost only 23 and 16 seats in the House, and only two and three in the Senate. Another implication is that Republicans will do better than expected, because of the party's superior organization and financing. However, although Democrats still trail in these respects, they are quickly imitating their rivals' efforts.

Combining these levels of analysis brings us to the tricky matter of prediction, even trickier when six months remain before the election. The general expectation in the House is that the Democrats will make modest gains, winning 10-15 seats. Having done relatively well in the last two elections (gaining a net of ten seats since 1980), the Democrats have fewer opportunities, and these are further limited by the advantages of Republican opponents, the popularity of the president, the national party's campaigning resources, and favorable business conditions. Only a severe economic downturn is likely to change this outlook.

In the Senate, the Republicans' unfavorable numerical odds seem less threatening when races are examined individually. At least 12, and perhaps 14, of the party's 22 seats seem safe. New York's Alphonse D'Amato exemplifies the devices used for self-protection. A conservative in a historically liberal state, he won in 1980 only because of a split in the opposition, and with the aid of Reagan's coattails. Since then, he has been a tireless worker for state constituencies, while assuming liberal positions on such issues as tax deductibility of state income taxes and aid to Israel. His campaign treasury of \$6 million intimidated potential opponents as formidable as Geraldine Ferraro and Harry Belafonte, leaving him secure in November.

Among the 12 Democrats, six are also safe. Control of the Senate will therefore turn on the outcome of fourteen races, eight now held by Republicans (in Alabama, Florida, Idaho, Maryland, Nevada, North Carolina, South Dakota, and Wisconsin) and six (in California, Colorado, Louisiana, Missouri, Vermont, and -- by dint of the confusion caused by the LaRouche primary victories -- Illinois) held by Democrats. To be provocative, I will predict that five Republicans and two Democrats will lose. The result will be a Senate with fifty Republicans and fifty Democrats (with a variance of plus or minus three seats). With the

tie-breaking vote of Vice-President Bush, the Republicans will organize the Senate. But the tie will put Bush into a position both prominent and threatening, and leads me to a concluding look at presidential politics.

In 1988, for the first time in twenty years, an incumbent president will not be on the ballot. The election will therefore be a relatively pure test of the effect on voting of variables such as issues, ideology and party identification. In particular, the election will provide a real-world test of the hypothesis that a Republican realignment is now in progress.

Bush is clearly the leading candidate for the Republican nomination, and his potential role as tie-breaker in the Senate would increase his prominence. Yet, he has little personal appeal, as evidenced by his loss to Ted Kennedy in Gallup "trial heats" in 1985. He must campaign on the basis of the Reagan record to which he is completely tied, and with which he will become further identified in the Senate. His victory in the election would be a convincing demonstration that the voters have become predominantly Republican.

For the Democrats, the 1988 election is a final opportunity to reassert their past status as the national majority. They will contest the presidency under favorable circumstances. There is the inevitable swing of the pendulum, as voters hear that "it's time for a change." Whether the candidate is Hart, Cuomo, Bradley or "Who?," there will be a new generation of party leadership, supported by a revived national organization. An economic downturn is likely, and international crises are always possible. By normal rules, the Democrats should win the White House in 1988. If they lose -- for the fifth time in six tries since Lyndon Johnson -- they can no longer excuse their loss by deprecating their own candidates, such as Carter, or by awesomely reflecting on the skills of Reagan, "the great communicator." In this race, the whole stable will be at stake, not only the horse.

PACs in the 1986 Elections

Theodore J. Eismeier

Hamilton College

The congressional elections of 1986 are the next act in a partisan drama which began in 1980 with Ronald Reagan's sweeping victory. After the indecisive midterm election of 1982 and Reagan's shallow landslide of 1984, the stakes are high for both parties. The Republicans must buck history and, in the Senate, numbers to keep their legislative vantage point and lend credence to claims about realignment. Perceived by some as rudderless, congressional Democrats badly need something that can be declared a victory and vindication of their nascent legislative agenda.

Along with the play of national issues and the quality of the parties' pools of candidates, the distribution of financial resources also helps shape the outcome of congressional elections. And by all appearances the costs of democracy will continue to grow. Only three months into 1986, the Federal Election Commission reported, Senate candidates had already raised almost \$80 million, including \$54 million from individuals and more than \$26 million from PACs. Still more than seven months from the election, more than \$100 million had already been spent in congressional campaigns.

Although in 1984 PACs accounted for only a third of the receipts of House candidates and less than a fifth of those of Senate candidates, this new breed of political organization continues to attract attention. In part, of course, this reflects widespread concern about the putative role of PACs as procurers of influence in Congress. Others see in the PAC explosion, which only recently has begun to subside, a force with the potential to shift the balance of power between the parties and between incumbents and challengers. A look at the recent history of PAC activity in congressional elections may provide us with some clues about their role in 1986.

Any such history needs to emphasize the great diversity not only across but within PAC types. There is, of course, some truth in characterizations of the major PAC types -- corporate and labor committees moving like opposing partisans; trade PACs, lacking imagination if not money, seeking access only to incumbents; non-connected PACs charting an adversarial course. Still, the labels of partisans, access seekers, and adversaries are too blunt to capture the variety within each class. Moreover, any given PAC may itself operate with multiple and perhaps conflicting goals. The managers of corporate and trade PACs may wish to use contributions as a means of securing access, but their contributors may wish the PAC to be a vehicle for ideology or partisanship. Labor PACs obviously want to maximize the Democratic

cohort in Congress, but they must build and cement friendly relations with anxious incumbents, who may in fact have little objective need for their money. Any non-connected PAC may face a tradeoff between practical political influence and organizational maintenance.

These divergent motives have interacted with the prevailing national political conditions to produce distinctive patterns of PAC giving in recent elections. The pattern produced in 1980 reinforced other important advantages for the Republicans in that election. Labor money was spent defensively; more than two-thirds of the \$12.2 million spent by labor PACs in the House and Senate races went to Democratic incumbents. Labor PACs invested only \$1.9 million in Democratic challengers, and this accounted for virtually all of the PAC contributions to these candidates. On the other hand, PAC money poured into the coffers of Republican challengers in unprecedented amounts. Not surprisingly, about half of the \$4.3 million in direct contributions by non-connected PACs went to Republican challengers. What was surprising was the spending on these candidates by business PACs. Angered at the Carter administration and emboldened by auguries favoring the Republicans, corporate PACs spent \$5.4 million on Republican challengers, 20 percent of their total spending in House races and 47 percent of their spending in Senate races. And in some of the most disgruntled industries -- construction, oil, mining, textiles -- far higher percentages of spending went to challengers. Even the PACs of trade associations, notorious for their dedication to incumbents, spent \$3.1 of their \$15 million total on Republican challengers. This wherewithal provided a necessary if not sufficient condition for substantial Republican gains in Congress.

In 1982 the resources of corporate and trade PACs were redeployed from the Republican challengers to incumbents of both parties; although total spending by these groups increased from \$33 million to \$47 million, spending on Republican challengers declined from \$8.5 million to only less than \$5 million. With national economic conditions favoring the Democrats, many business PACs apparently elected to shore up Republican gains of the last election while currying favor with likely winners among Democratic incumbents. This same power of incumbency tended to crowd out investments in Democratic challengers by labor PACs, which even in this promising election spent half of their \$14.6 million on Democratic incumbents, including almost \$5 million on those with safe seats. Thus, in the 1981-82 election cycle average PAC receipts were actually greater for serious Republican challengers than they were for such Democratic challengers.

What is most interesting about the 1984 election is what did not happen. For a variety of reasons -- uncertainties in the year before the election, a relatively weak crop of Republican challengers, the persuasive powers of Tony Coelho -- the Republican dream and the Democratic nightmare of a repeat of the PAC partisanship of 1980 never occurred. Corporate PACs, for

example, spent almost twice as much in 1984 than in 1980, but only \$3.1 million on Republican challengers, \$1.3 million less than they spent in 1980. Overall, it was a year in which PACs tilted toward incumbents of both parties with the result that the Republican offensive was substantially blunted.

Thus, an electoral system that was subjected to an external shock in 1980 appears to have returned to equilibrium. Democrats in Congress have become increasingly adept at marketing themselves to business interests, even as their national campaign committees have communicated to these interests the risks of Republican partisanship. Indeed, faced with the likelihood of continuing Democratic dominance in the House, most corporate and trade PACs seem content simply to preserve the partisan division of Congress, only occasionally finding a weak Democrat on whom to pounce. Labor PACs continue to be a reliable if not very malleable source of support for Democrats. Never as strong as they boasted and their critics feared, non-connected PACs on the right have now had to suffer through six years of Ronald Reagan's accommodation to the realities of Washington politics, and now they face as well competition from PACs of the left.

This new equilibrium should mean prudential PAC strategies again in 1986. Early reports indicate an even greater emphasis on Senate races, with 40 percent of all PAC contributions through March 31, 1986 devoted to Senate candidates. Incumbent Republicans, not surprisingly, dominate the list of top recipients of the \$16.4 million contributed by PACs during this period. Senate races attracting PAC money for challengers include California, South Dakota, Idaho, Florida, and Alabama. As usual, challengers in House races had received little PAC money -- only \$800,000 -- by this time in the cycle, and it appears unlikely that many challengers from either party will find much PAC support. Not only does the Senate offer more important investment opportunities for PACs, but the pull of money towards House incumbents of both parties remains strong. Indeed, the false sense of anxiety of Democratic incumbents may be one obstacle to the achievement of a veto-proof House in 1986.

Aside from the all out battle for control of the Senate, the 1986 election will be one of maneuvering for future advantage by both political parties. Despite the optimistic talk of 1984, Republicans will probably content themselves with escaping the potential disaster of the second midterm. Democrats will content themselves with a modest gain in seats and any issue -- protectionism seems a likely candidate -- that seems to move voters. Both parties will continue well to maneuver for advantage with PACs, with the Republicans trying to unleash the potential partisanship of corporate and trade PACs and the Democrats attempting to tame it.

ABSTRACTS

Below are brief abstracts of articles culled from a wide array of journals dated March 1985 to the present, and are listed alphabetically by author.

Alt, James E., Washington University, "Political Parties, World Demand and Unemployment: Domestic and International Sources of Economic Activity," *American Political Science Review*, vol 79, no. 4, pp. 1016-1040, December 1985.

This article examines unemployment in fourteen western industrial nations between 1960 and 1983 and finds that political institutions and economic regime constraints often determine whether partisan effects on unemployment will be sustained, transitory, or absent.

Barnes, Samuel H. and Peter McDonough, University of Michigan, and Antonio Lopez Pina, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, "The Development of Partisanship in New Democracies: The Case of Spain," *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 695-720, November 1985.

This study analyzes the development of party identification, left-right tence, and affect for political leaders in Spain during the transition to democratic monarchy. Demonstrates that growth of party identification has lagged behind the acquisition of left-right placement and opinions of leaders.

Born, Richard, Vassar College, "Partisan Intentions and Election Day Realities in the Congressional Redistricting Process," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 79, no. 2, pp. 305-319, June 1985.

The author analyzes districting plans from 1952 to 1982 and finds that partisan control of redistricting has a modest effect on delegate seat outcomes. Further, the results indicate that partisan gerrymandering has become less pervasive.

Budge, Ian, European University Institute and University of Essex, "Party Factions and Government Reshuffles: A General Hypothesis Tested Against Data From Twenty Post-War Democracies," *European Journal Of Political Research*, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 327-334, September 1985.

This article presents a hypothesis of party factional behavior that states that reshuffles are more frequent where Prime Ministers have more freedom of action and decline where they have less freedom. The hypothesis is proven by single party governments.

Buell, Emmett H. Jr., Denison University, and Lee Sigelman, University of Kentucky, "An Army That Meets Every Sunday? Popular Support for the Moral Majority in 1980," *Social Science Quarterly*, vol. 66, no. 2, pp. 426-434, June 1985.

The authors operationalize a measure for Moral Majority's support in 1980 that allows for ambivalence as well as a reflection of the affective reaction to the organization and the degree of attachment of the respondent. The outcome shows a picture of relatively weak support for the Moral Majority.

Bullock, Charles S. III, University of Georgia, "Congressional Roll Call

Voting in a Two Party South," **Social Science Quarterly**, vol. 66, no. 4, pp. 789-804, December 1985.

As the Republican growth in the South has reflected in congressional election victories, the correlates of southern congressional voting have changed. The constituency characteristics that used to dominate voting patterns have declined and partisanship has increased significantly as a predictive factor. There is a much stronger tendency of Republican congressmen to vote together on the issue studied, while southern Democrats continue to show variation.

Burrell, Barbara C., State University of New York at Albany, "Local Party Committees, Task Performance, and Organizational Vitality," **Western Political Quarterly**, vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 48-66, March 1986.

The author uses a comparative survey of grass roots activists in Connecticut and Michigan parties measuring: ability to attract recruits, the degree to which membership is directed to winning elections. Both parties in each state do have cadres of active members who are task oriented, effective, and active in recruiting new members.

Cain, Bruce C., California Institute of Technology, "Assessing the Partisan Effects of Redistricting," **American Political Science Review**, vol. 79, no. 2, pp. 320-334, June 1985.

Study assessing the reality behind the politician's perception that redistricting matters while focusing on the impact of boundary changes on the partisan competition of seats. Cain suggests that if recent trends toward independence from parties continue, redistricting in the future could come to focus more on displacement issues and less on the partisan makeup of districts.

Clarke, Harold, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Kai Hildebrandt and Lawrence LeDuc, University of Windsor, Jon Pammett, Carleton University, "Issue Volatility and Partisan Linkages in Canada, Great Britain, the United States, and West Germany," **European Journal of Political Research**, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 237-264, September 1985.

Study measuring the salience of issues in the elections of four countries, and the linkage of issues to political parties. Concludes that the volatility of issues makes it difficult to sustain a consistent issue/party link over time.

Craig, Stephen C., University of Florida, "Partisanship, Independence, and No Preference: Another Look at the Measurement of Party Identification," **American Journal of Political Science**, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 274-290, May 1985.

Study that argues that the decline of partisanship is due less with the way people view parties than with their orientation toward the symbols of partisanship independence.

Dalton, Russell J., Florida State University, "Political Parties and Political Representation: Party Supporters and Party Elites in Nine Nations," **Comparative Political Studies**, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 267-299, October 1985.

This article examines how well parties perform their representation role and finds that the clarity of party positions strongly influences the efficiency of a party linkage process.

Davies, Philip John, "The Drama of the Campaign: Theatre, Production, and Style in American Elections," **Parliamentary Affairs**, vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 98-114, January 1986

The emphasis of the article is on the increased use of media in American elections and the subsequent emphasis on theatricality, especially at the expense of substance. There is some discussion of the relationship between these developments and the nature of American political parties.

Ersson, Svante, University of Umea, Kenneth Janda, Northwestern University, and Jan-Erik Lane, University of Umea, "Ecology of Party Strength in Western Europe: A Regional Analysis," **Comparative Political Studies**, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 170-205, July 1985.

An ecological analysis of the electoral outcomes at the regional level of the political parties in sixteen European democracies.

Fainstein, Susan S., Rutgers University, and Norman I. Fainstein, New School for Social Research, "Economic Restructuring and the Rise of Urban Social Movements," **Urban Affairs Quarterly**, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 187-206, December 1985.

By using a case study of New York City, the authors argue that while conditions under which urban protest might arise are due to economic reorganization and dislocation, the actual occurrence reflects political factors. In New York, local dissatisfaction has been captured, channeled and contained by political mechanisms such as neighborhood advisory groups and localized concessions.

Franke, James L., Kansas State University and Douglas Dobson, Northern Illinois University, "Interest Groups: The Problem of Representation," **Western Political Quarterly**, vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 224-237, June 1985.

Franke and Dobson undertake a reexamination of the Luttbeg and Zeigler argument that leaders of groups may become distanced from their followers. By studying the leaders and the members of senior citizens organizations, Franke and Dobson find that there is general agreement between the groups on the goals and tactics of the organization. They also find that communication with members is not affected by the degree of attachment of the members.

Freundreis, John P., University of Texas, Dallas, and Richard W. Waterman, Washington University, "PAC Contributions and Legislative Behav-

ior (Senate Voting on Trucking Deregulation)," **Social Science Quarterly**, vol. 66, no. 2, pp. 401-412, June 1985.

In a multivariate analysis of Senate voting on trucking deregulation, the impact of receipt of PAC contributions is a significant factor in influencing the vote and becomes strongest for those Senators closest to reelection.

Giles, Michael W., Emory University, and Arthur S. Evans, Florida Atlantic University, "External Threat, Perceived Threat, and Group Identity," **Social Studies Quarterly**, vol. 65, no. 1, pp. 50-66, March 1985.

In a study of "white" group identification, higher levels of external threat (measured as a higher concentration of blacks in the area) were not found to yield higher levels of perceived threat except among respondents with a low sense of political efficacy.

Greenberg, Joseph, and Shlomo Weber, University of Haifa, "Multiparty Equilibria Under Proportional Representation," **American Political Science Review**, vol. 79, no. 3, pp. 693-703, September 1985.

This article defines and proves the existence of an equilibrium under proportional representation.

Hamill, Ruth C., Milton Lodge, and Frederick Blake, State University of New York at Stony Brook, "The Breadth, Depth, and Utility of Class, Partisan, and Ideological Schemata," **American Journal of Political Science**, vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 850-870, November 1985.

The authors compare class, partisan, and ideological schemata in terms of utility in discriminating among political policies. They find that the rich-poor schema is the most effective on spend-save issues, while the partisan and ideological schematas are effective across the full range of issues.

Harmel, Robert and Keith E. Hamm, Texas A&M University, "Development of a Party Role in a No-Party Legislature," **Western Political Quarterly**, vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 79-92, March 1986.

The authors examine the changes in organization and behavior in the Texas House, traditionally a "no-party legislature," as Republican membership grows. Changes have been observed organizationally as a Democratic but not Republican caucus have been organized. Also, legislative behavior has been modified as voting has become less fractionalized and more bi-fractional. Republicans have also become more cohesive and more conservative.

Hunter, Albert, and Richard Fritz, "Class, Status, and Power Structures of Community Elites: A Comparative Case Study," **Social Science Quarterly**, vol. 66, no. 3, pp 602-616, September 1985.

Four Chicago suburbs were selected to reflect a socioeconomic range. A block model analysis of an elite survey showed that variation in

the class, status, and power structures varied more by ecological position than by socioeconomic classification.

Janda, Kenneth, Northwestern University, and Desmond S. King, University of Edinburgh, "Formalizing and Testing Duverger's Theory on Political Parties," *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 139-169, July 1985.

The authors substantiate most of Duverger's bivariate propositions about party traits and suggest that there is a need to construct a more general and integrated theory of parties that incorporates both the party level and system level factors in explaining causes and consequences of party structure.

Jones, Ruth S., and Warren E. Miller, Arizona State University, "Financing Campaigns: Macro Level Innovation and Micro Level Response," *Western Political Quarterly*, vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 187-210, June 1985.

Both federal campaign fund check-off contributions and PAC contributions are relatively unrelated to meaningful political activity. Especially PACs reflect changes in the law and changes in the techniques of campaign fund raising. Because PACs have an organizational presence, the authors suggest they may become socialization agents for those who are their contributors.

Kelley, Jonathan, Ian McAllister, and Anthony Mughan, The Australian National University, "The Decline of Class Revisted: Class and Party in England, 1964-1979," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 79, no. 3, pp. 719-737, September 1985.

The authors argue that the original "decline of class" theories which predicted that economic growth would undermine parties of the left, were misplaced. Instead, through a variety of strategies these parties have been able to alter the basis of their appeal to the electorate on many issues. While decreasing class polarization is the result of adaptation, it does not signal the inevitable demise of working-class parties.

Knight, Kathleen, University of Houston, "Ideology in the 1980 Election: Ideological Sophistication Does Matter," *Journal of Politics*, vol. 47, no. 3, pp. 828-853, August 1985.

This article examines the effects of partisanship, ideological identification and policy preferences on the presidential vote in 1980. It concludes that when ideological sentiment is supported by the level of sophistication required to merit classification as an "ideologue" it has substantial impact on candidate choice.

LeDuc, Lawrence, University of Windsor, "Partisan Change and Dealignment in Canada, Great Britain, and the United States," **Comparative Politics**, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 379-398, July 1985.

In all cases dealignment may be followed not by the advent of new alignment but by a continuation of the national political life in a slightly less stable form.

McAllister, Ian, The Australian National University, "Campaign Activities and Electoral Outcomes in Britain: 1979 and 1983," **Public Opinion Quarterly**, vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 489-503, Winter 1985.

By using survey data from 1979 and 1983, the author compares the reported impact of three types of campaign activity: canvassing, advertising, and electronic media broadcasts. The impact of the first two is negligible, but changes reported as a result of electronic broadcasts ranged as high as 3.4%.

McBride, Stephen, Lakehead University, "Corporatism, Public Policy, and the Labour Movement: A Comparative Study," **Political Studies**, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 439-456, September 1985.

An empirical investigation of the relationship between the two dimensions of corporatism (1) structures of state-interest group interactions and 2) groups which are licensed by the state and granted a monopoly in their sphere in return for some control over their structure) shows an inverse relationship. This raises serious questions about the accepted definition of corporatism and its use.

Marmor, Theodore R., Yale University, "The Lessons of Mondale's Defeat," **Political Quarterly**, vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 153-166, April-June 1985.

The lesson of the election is that Mondale's organization did not lose the election; his inability to communicate with mass publics did.

Merkel, Peter H., University of California, Santa Barbara, "Mapping the Temporal Universe of Party Governments," **The Review of Politics**, vol. 47, no. 4, pp. 483-515, October 1985.

The author compares sixteen party-dominated systems to determine the parameters of their institutional, participatory, and policymaking patterns that will approximate a definition of party government. The author finds that those dimensions most likely to be party-dominated are those with executive-dominated parliamentary systems, a bi-polar Left-Right based party system, a degree of centralization, and considerable problem solving capacity.

Messina, Anthony M., University of Notre Dame, "Race and Party Competition in Britain: Policy Formation in the Post-Consensus Period," **Parliamentary Affairs**, vol. 38, no. 4, pp. 423-436, Autumn 1985.

An explanation of the divergence of the Labour and Conservative parties' policies on race rests on the perception of party leaders of the long term political interests of the parties. As Labour and Conservative parties began appealing to markedly different constituencies for electoral differences, their policies on a constituency-relevant issue - race - began to diverge.

Mueller, D. C., and P. Murrell, University of Maryland, "Interest Groups and the Size of Government," *Public Choice*, vol. 48, no. 2, pp 125-146, 1986.

The basic hypothesis is the relative size of government is positively related to the number of organized interest groups. The authors also look at determinants for interest group formation, including the population of the country, the decentralization of government, and the length of time the government has been modernized. They find a strong relationship between the number of groups and the size of the government. There is a negative relationship between population and government size but a positive correlation between the percentage of the population voting and government size.

Neimi, Richard G., G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Harold W. Stanley, C. Lawrence Evans, University of Rochester, "Testing the Converse Partisanship Model with New Electorates," *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 300-322, October 1985.

The authors present an analysis of the Converse model and find that the cases in which experience and age are not collinear, the Converse model failed to account for the strength of partisanship found among new electorates, thereby raising doubts about the model in general.

O'Conner, Karen, and Lee Epstein, Emory University, "Bridging the Gap Between Congress and the Supreme Court: Interest Groups and the Erosion of the American Rule Governing the Awards of Attorney's Fees," *Western Political Quarterly*, vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 238-249, June 1985.

The 1964 Civil Rights Act and subsequent Supreme Court rulings led to the award of attorney's fees in some cases even if the plaintiff didn't win. The authors develop the implications of these decisions for interest groups, particularly those public interest groups.

Pinto-Duschinsky, Michael, "Trends in British Political Funding, 1979-83," *Parliamentary Affairs*, vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 328-347, Summer 1985.

This is an analysis of the sources, relative rates, and limitations on campaign funding and their implications for the parties in the U.K. The author concludes that the legislative changes that may be expected to benefit Conservatives have, in fact, worked to the advantage of the Alliance that has used direct mail techniques to increase the number of large and small contributors.

Poole, Keith T., Carnegie-Mellon University, and R. Steven Daniels, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, "Ideology, Party, and Voting in the US Congress 1959-1980," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 79, no. 2, pp. 373-399, June 1985.

Analysis shows that the liberal-conservative and party evaluative dimensions used by the interest groups are consistent with much of the roll-call voting in Congress.

Rasmussen, Jorgen S. and James M. McCormick, Iowa State University, "The

Influence of Ideology on British Labour MPs in Voting on EEC Issues," **Legislative Studies Quarterly**, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 203-222, May 1985.

An examination of the extent to which ideological concerns motivated the voting of British MPs from 1974-1979 on twelve contentious divisions concerning the Common Market. Ideology proved to be less influential than had been anticipated at least in part because it affected votes on administrative details less than it did those on general principles.

Richards, D. J., Tufts University, "A Note on the Importance of Cost Structures for the Behavior of Political Action Committees," **Public Choice**, vol. 48, no. 1, pp. 71-80, 1986.

Attention should be paid to the cost structures of PACs because the costs will directly affect their ability to "buy" political benefits.

Schlesinger, Joseph A., Michigan State University, "The New American Political Party," **American Political Science Review**, vol. 79, no. 4, pp. 1152-1169, December 1985.

This article examines the changes in American political parties in the twentieth century and concludes that American parties are stronger than before.

Strom, Kaare, Michigan State University, "Party Goals and Government Performance in Parliamentary Democracy," **American Political Science Review**, vol. 79, no. 3, pp. 738-754, September 1985.

This study claims that minority governments are clearly superior, in some respects, to majority governments. The author argues that minority government formation may enhance systemic responsiveness and accountability. The findings support the explanation of minority governments as rational cabinet solutions.

Uslaner, Eric M. and M. Margaret Conway, University of Maryland-College Park, "The Responsive Congressional Electorate: Watergate, the Economy, and Vote Choice in 1974," **American Political Science Review**, vol. 79, no. 3, pp. 788-803, September 1985.

This examination of the voting of standpatters and switchers finds that the former are motivated by party identification, with small Watergate effects. Switchers find weaker party identification but more pronounced Watergate and economic effects.

Wilson, Graham, University of Wisconsin, Madison, "The American Election Campaign," **Political Quarterly**, vol. 56, no. 1, pp. 47-55, Jan-March 1985.

This is a general commentary on the 1984 election, in which the author touches on the nature of the parties and the impact that they had on the election.

Wright, Gerald C., Indiana University, Robert S. Erikson and John P. McIver, University of Houston, "Measuring State Partisanship and Ideology with Survey Data," **Journal of Politics**, vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 469-489, May 1985.

This article discusses the problem of the lack of data regarding state politics and suggest a need for survey based measures of state partisanship.

Wright, John R., University of Iowa, "PACs, Contributions and Roll Calls: An Organizational Perspective," **American Political Science Review**, vol. 79, no. 2, pp. 400-414, June 1985.

This article attempts to explain the extent to which PAC contributions are capable of influencing congressional voting decisions. The author argues that the influence of PACs on congressional voting is severely constrained by the organizational arrangements through which money is raised. Since money is raised at the local level, congressmen cultivate relationships with local officials and this undercuts the influence of professional lobbyists.

Wright, John R., University of Iowa, and Arthur S. Goldberg, University of Rochester, "Risk and Uncertainty as Factors in the Durability of Political Coalitions," **American Political Science Review**, vol. 79, no. 3, pp. 704-718, September 1985.

This article formalizes a dynamic model of a maintenance process and through computer simulation, assesses the impact of polarization, uncertainty and risk attitudes on coalitions and their members.

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